INTRODUCTION

This article aims to develop a fundamental understanding of the theoretical background to nonproliferation; by defining concepts, i.e. deterrence, disarmament and arms control; discussing the role of culture in shaping security culture, thus approaches to nonproliferation; and focusing on the Middle East in relation to nonproliferation regimes, through the Middle East Peace Process, challenges, obstacles and the role of United States as an external player. It is relevant to argue that nonproliferation regimes (as a response to the nuclear proliferation during the Cold War and to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation in post-Cold War era) face political, economic, cultural and strategic challenges. These challenges, in the form of non-compliance and non-participation, are especially acute in the Middle East. They need to be addressed through regional and global security arrangements.

DETERRENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

In January 1952, United Nations Assembly established a Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a Draft Treaty for effective international control of
atomic energy and elimination of all major weapons, adaptable to mass destruction.\footnote{Anatol Rapoport, “The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict.” In \textit{Arms Races} (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 366-92.} Implying “wishful thinking” rather than enforcement, these proposals articulated the goal of disarmament not to regulate, but to prevent war, the elimination of instruments adaptable to mass destruction, the establishment of an effective system of international control to insure compliance. The UN Disarmament Commission was the best attempt to reach consensus between US and USSR. However, during the Cold War and post-Cold War era, the global arsenal has kept growing quantitatively and qualitatively. Therefore, the question of nuclear deterrence needs to be defined and addressed.

Within the theoretical debate on nuclear deterrence, there are essential propositions that a near-consensus is achieved in the realist camp:\footnote{Paul Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, “Chapter 8: Theories of Deterrence; Arms Control and Strategic Stability,” in \textit{Contending Theories of International Relations}, (Longman, New York, 2001), 344- 415.}

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] Principal purpose of nuclear weapons is not to wage but to preclude large-scale war among major powers.
\item[b.] Nuclear deterrence can not prevent most forms of conflict; i.e. guerrilla insurgencies, civil wars.
\item[c.] Effective nuclear deterrence requires constant and costly technological advancement.
\item[d.] Nuclear deterrence is both a psychological- political and military- technological concept. An adequate military capability has to inflict “an unacceptable level of damage” on the adversary; stated by Henry Kissinger as: “Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor”.\footnote{ibid.}
\item[e.] In order to be effective, a deterrent capability can not be kept secret. A certain amount of knowledge has to be reflected to the adversary, so that the interpretation of data causes fear.
\item[f.] A nuclear power relies on deterrence, by preventing a nuclear attack on its own allies and vital interests, thanks to the conventional defense capabilities that can confront any non-nuclear military threats.
\item[g.] The distinction between “preventive war” and “preemptive war” should be considered. Preventive war indicates a premeditation to be carried out at a preferred time; whereas preemptive war is resorted by a government, under the pressure of the assumption that the outbreak of nuclear war is inevitable and it must strike first, not to lose the advantages of executing disarming blow.
\end{itemize}

Building on top of nuclear deterrence; nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control are distinct concepts that are generally used interchangeably. Disarmament is the reduction or elimination of armaments and the prohibition of any future production, either completely or partially. For instance, German disarmament at the end of World War II was complete disarmament, as Nazi Germany was defeated and surrendered unconditionally. No government has ever achieved general/complete disarmament on a voluntary basis. Hence, strategic arms reductions have been negotiated for deterrence and strategic stability of lower-level nuclear systems. Arms control, on the other hand, implies the management of arms to enhance security, promote political and strategic objectives; to prevent the weapons
technology from reducing security and predictability of the international environment.⁴ Arms control imposes restraints, regulations and limitations to the qualitative design, quantitative production or deployment of planned, transferred or threatened military forces and weapons. These processes necessitate formal agreement or informal collaboration between adversaries. Thus, not all states can agree to cooperate on arms control.

The central aim of both disarmament and arms control is to minimize the tension and risks of weapons without weakening deterrence of any party involved. But states might perceive deterrence as a zero-sum game, not being willing to comply with norms in order to pursue their vital interests. For instance, Western powers, for long, have resisted accepting the cessation of nuclear testing without a comprehensive nuclear disarmament; based on the perception that as long as nuclear weapons were an integral part of deterrence, they would need nuclear testing to pursue their deterrent capabilities. Great powers, except France and China, have finally agreed on the nuclear test ban, only when it was in their interest to prevent radioactive fallout.⁵ In spite of the urge for a comprehensive test ban, superpowers have continued the arms race and nuclear proliferation, with no reduction in their lethal arsenal.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, during the early 90s, the concern for proliferation of WMD and non-state actors has increasingly become vital. Nonproliferation has centered on the intention of blocking the acquisition and production of WMD as well as deterring its use. However, it is relevant to ask whether the disarmament/ arms control regimes and treaties codify an existing situation that is acceptable to all parties involved, and to what extend and under which circumstances they can contribute to the emergence of new normative standards to shape the international system. Obviously, different paradigms within the international relations theory; i.e. neo/realism, neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, explain the role of norms in the international system through distinctive lenses. The 1990s have contributed to strengthen nonproliferation through new agendas, such as Chemical Weapons Convention for the intrusion of on-site inspection provisions; Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that was signed for 25 years initially and has been extended indefinitely in 1995, as an international effort to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.⁶ At the turn of the century, despite such arms control constraints, the major concern of the US, reflected in US foreign policy, has become additional states, i.e. rogue states, acquiring WMD and missile capabilities of striking the United States, such as North Korea being able to deploy nuclear warheads as an emerging nuclear state. As of 1999, the US declared that it would face a threat sufficiently great to justify the deployment of a limited national missile defense, as soon as it was technically possible. The “preemptive strike” and “war on terror” arguments have gone hand in hand with the non-proliferation concerns, i.e. at the hands of non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda. The “unholy alliance” between transnational terror elements and Middle Eastern regimes has become the central cause of fear in USA.⁷ Comparing Cold War deterrence, where states rested upon the prospect of retaliation in response to aggression, to post- Cold War deterrence; it is argued that an adversary could be denied its goal because of its negated or blunted military capabilities.⁸

⁷ Beverly Milton and Peter Hincliffe, “After the Storm,” in Conflicts in the Middle East (Routledge, 2004), 120.
⁸ Ibid.
Strongly tied to nuclear deterrence, disarmament and arms control issues; international terrorism has become a significant global concern. International terrorism cuts across several layers of analysis; such as psychology of individuals, religious and ideological beliefs of groups, international politics within states, governments and non-state actors. Categorizing states; there are governments that officially sponsor international terrorism, governments of targeted countries and governments that support, host, train and shelter terrorist organizations. With respect to the proliferation of WMD, several organized terrorist groups have sophisticated access to modern weapons technology, electronic communication, globally computerized operations between subsidiaries and international transportation facilities as well as logistics. The danger of such a systematized establishment is often called “catastrophic terrorism” of groups possessing WMD (nuclear, chemical, biological-NBC) and computer viruses.9

Terrorism, among many definitions, involves the use of violence by non-state actors against the institutions or citizens of states for ideological purposes, to produce a shock and fear. In the atmosphere of trauma, chaos, and fear of the unknown, these groups aim to make people feel vulnerable and undermine their confidence in the governments to protect them. Thus, terrorist groups put pressure on the governments to negotiate with them and take specific actions to satisfy their desires. What makes nonproliferation of such groups challenging is basically the legitimacy crisis; states do not want to negotiate with terrorist groups, for such negotiation constitutes a recognition of their legitimacy. Even though there are multilateral efforts to combat terrorism through United Nations, there are political, ideological, cultural and religious factors that cause frustration and impact the policy implementations of states. Hence, intergovernmental cooperation is complicated in the effort to curb international terrorism.

Rouge regimes, that are acquiring WMD and the means of delivering them by clandestine infiltration and missile technologies, constitute a perceived threat to American national security. Richard K. Betts argues that, United States has destroyed its biological weapons arsenal through the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, and it will have destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile by 2008 as required by the Chemical Weapons Convention that came into force in 1997.10 Betts concludes that United States will have no WMD capability to threaten retaliation except nuclear weapons. Hence, working on the case scenarios about terrorist attacks with WMD, which indicate Middle Eastern oriented terrorist organizations and Middle Eastern states that host or sponsor these groups at most, the US has defined two challenges that are inseparable: challenges from terrorists that operate on their own and rogue states with WMD programs and/or support international terrorists. Betts does not recommend a neo-isolationist policy, but argues that the US should scale its commitments down not to make the “world’s policeman” as the terrorists’ number one target. Betts asserts that: “American activism to guarantee international stability is, paradoxically, the prime source of American vulnerability”.11 Betts’ article has been published in the Foreign Affairs journal in 1998, prior to September 11th and US war on terror/ Operation Iraqi freedom to “disarm” Iraq. But, when his argument is applied to these developments, it is relevant to explain the “hatred” against American interventionism.

At the beginning of the 21st century, American policy priorities have shifted from economic prosperity to concern for military security against international terrorists and WMD

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11 ibid.
proliferators, deterrence and defense. WMD have created “balance of terror” between uneasily existing adversaries. Despite nonproliferation attempts, rouge states that are not proficient in cyber-war operations might resort to WMD threats. Nuclear weapons can enable smaller states to neutralize US information technologies. Thus, WMD are not obsolescent or obsolete either for great powers or regional rouges completely. Yet, discussed elsewhere in this article, there are arguments of WMD as a “diminishing currency”, especially among Middle Eastern states, due to the American “preemptive strike” doctrine. Moreover, the global public opinion shapes the WMD taboo as illegitimate, excessively destructive, inhumane and obsolete. Nowadays, the development of WMD does not necessarily enhance the status or rank of a nation in the international power hierarchy; instead it does cause active hostility, i.e. the case of Iran’s nuclear ambitions in global arena, and deteriorates national security.

CULTURE, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

Does culture matter, while explaining the underlying conditions for multilateralism of disarmament and arms control? Keith Krause explains the multi-lateralization and regionalization of security in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions, as a result of global change and interdependence of states, leading to cross-cultural aspects of contemporary security in policy debates. He gives Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” proposition as a challenge for global security. Krause defines security culture as the “cultural dimension of multilateral security-building and arms control dialogues”. Culture, as it refers to non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and security-building issues, consists of widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes in which a state’s interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived. In this sense, Krause provides a scheme of cultural influences on multilateral arms control, non-proliferation and security-building dialogues as follows:

In this diagram; strategic culture refers to role of armed forces, threat perceptions and security doctrines, i.e. enemy images; political culture refers to institutions, stance towards multilateralism, attitudes towards violence and conflict resolution; diplomatic culture is the international standing and negotiation strategies. All of these sub-cultures intersect with the security culture defined above.

Based on this culture-based theoretical framework, Krause and Latham argue that, the attempts by Western states to construct a global non-proliferation, arms control and

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13 ibid.
disarmament regime (NACD) have resulted from the end of Cold War.\textsuperscript{14} Military technologies, i.e. WMD, delivery systems and certain conventional weapons, have destabilized the international environment, by proliferation risks. To reduce the uncertainty, it is assumed that the Western NACD policies have aimed to provide the global “public good” of international peace and security, due to their “benign” and “rational” orientation. In Krause and Latham’s formulation; Western and Northern approaches to nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament on security-building issues are integral parts of the “Western security culture”. It is argued that “arms control” has been “invented” during the Cold War as a response to “nuclear revolution” as an attempt to regulate and stabilize the East-West conflict, by reducing the risk and destructiveness of war, as well as redirecting resources devoted to armaments to other ends. On top of arms control, development of “verification” and “compliance-monitoring norms” has preceded simple enforcement. Reinforcing the architecture of East-West NACD cultures, it is argued that confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) have reached further transparency. But, to what extent have these “Western”, “benign” propositions worked in different cultural settings, i.e. in the Middle East? If there is a possibility of cheating, thus a need for “verification” and “monitoring”, how can both sides develop enough trust to sign an arms control agreement? Historical evidence shows that there have been many cases, where the states have actually signed the nonproliferation treaties but have obviously violated them. Thus, the issue of “trust” has been deeply challenged.

The Post-Cold War international security environment has been dominated by the threat of rogue states and their proliferation of WMD. Krause and Latham quote Michael Klare’s definition of the “rogue doctrine”; as the “characterization of hostile Third World states with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities, as nuclear outlaws sabotaging the prevailing world order”.\textsuperscript{15} Literally and in terms of perceptions, “rogue” refers to dishonesty, irresponsibility, immorality and danger. Hence, Krause and Latham agree that this doctrine indicates a new form of “strategic Orientalism”. For instance, Huntington formulates Confucian-Islamic connection in opposition to the West, as “designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military power of the West”.\textsuperscript{16} Through culture-oriented explanations, contemporary Western NACD culture targets the “East”, where proliferation of WMD is the threat and nonproliferation is the solution. The clearest expression of this consensus was, first, 1993 declaration of “counter-proliferation policy” by American Secretary of Defense Les Aspin as: “Diplomacy, treaty restrictions, security assurances, export controls, non-military sanctions and economic cooperation would remain the primary US means of preventing and coping with the proliferation of WMD”\textsuperscript{17}. Throughout the 90s, four principal strategies have been developed:\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Denial; preventing rogue states from acquiring WMDs, by construction of export control regimes such as Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
\end{itemize}

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{15} ibid.


\textsuperscript{18} ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
b. Disarmament; forcibly disarming rogue states by internationally supervised destruction of WMD capabilities, which was the case in Iraq after the Gulf Crisis,
c. Deterrence; using nuclear and high-technology conventional weapons to deter rogue states,
d. Defence; developing capabilities, i.e. anti-ballistic missile systems to defend against WMD.

Second clearest expression and experience would be George W. Bush’s statements on disarming the WMD in Iraq, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” and labeling this challenge as “War on Terror”, as well nonproliferation of “inhumane weapons” at the hands of international terrorist organizations. The dominant US strategy has become preemptive strike, i.e. to Iraq in 2003. The “National Security Strategy of USA”, released in September 2002, states that “USA must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use WMD against USA and its allies”.

Regarding the web of conflicts in the Middle East, Gabriel Ben-Dor extends the culture-based arguments to the NACD within regional political processes. Ben-Dor depicts conflicts in the Middle East with four superimposed concentric circles, each surrounding one another: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict sits at the innermost circle, next comes the Israeli conflict with the Arab states on territory and strategy. The following larger circle is the conflict between Zionism and Arab nationalism. The largest circle is Jewish aspirations confronting Islamic political doctrines. Analyzing the political and strategic culture in the Middle East, Ben-Dor associates “NACD culture” with the “conflict culture”. As part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, he lists cultural factors as religion; both Judaism and Islam providing total ideologies and civilizations, history; Arab states identifying Israel as the “agent of imperialism”, political structure; Israel as a Western parliamentary democracy against Arab monarchic dynasties and military autocracies, mentality; Arab mentality vs. Jewish mentality in global orientations. All of these cultural factors, according to Ben-Dor, pave the way to an asymmetry in nonproliferation that makes negotiation uneasy. The major source of asymmetry is caused by Israel’s official policy of nuclear ambiguity, which is the world’s worst-kept secret. Within the cultural framework, for many Arab states, the Israeli nuclear deterrent is proof of Jewish inherent aggression, threatening the security of its Arab neighbors. Substituting for the nuclear capabilities they lack, several Arab states have chosen to acquire chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, in terms of monitoring and verification to increase the transparency of nonproliferation, Middle Eastern cultural orientation has contradicted with the “Western” norms. Since monitoring and verification implies that the parties can not be trusted to keep word, the honor code and infringement of sovereignty of the party have been deteriorated. This honor orientation has been considered as one of the causes of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)’s weaknesses in conducting on-site inspections in Iraq, prior to Operation Iraqi freedom; due to the sensitivity of presidential sites,’ Iraqi pride and obsessive concern with humiliation, preconditions for inspections such as 15-minute delays or accompaniment of Iraqi officials to inspection sites the effectiveness of inspection regime was undermined.

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MIDDLE EAST AND NON-PROLIFERATION

A. Overview

The expectations that the end of the Cold War would bring stability and peace to the international environment have been blown, with respect to the non-conventional arms control and disarmament in particular. Since most of the Middle Eastern conflicts were considered as local conflicts corollary to superpower rivalry, it was believed that Middle East would get purified in the absence of Cold War tension. But, in the post-Cold War era, a new form of “Pax Americana” has become dominant in shaping the Middle Eastern arms control, US being the external player.

Nuclear ambitions of the Middle Eastern leaders go back to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s search for regional hegemony through the nuclear idea. As early as 1955, Egypt had founded its Atomic Energy Commission and Center for Nuclear Research. Following Egypt, nuclear ambitions of the Iranian Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, paved the way to the exchange of nuclear information with the United States, launching a nuclear programme in 1970s that allowed Iran to produce 21 nuclear plants in two decades. Even though the Shah was dethroned in 1979 revolution, the strategic rationale was maintained by the ayatollahs that seized power. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as part of the Iranian Islamic revolution, carried the hegemonic nuclear ambitions of the Shah further. The most symbolic figure seeking a nuclear bomb “brighter than the Baghdad Sun” is Saddam Hussein. Rafsanjani would state that: “It was made very clear during the Iran-Iraq war that chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons are very decisive. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons”. Seen in this statement, the role of WMD in the Middle East has long been perceived as the pre-requisite to symbolizing technological progress, regional hegemony and the guarantee of the survival of personal rule. For instance, the fatal blow to the Iraqi nuclear programme by the Israeli destruction of the Osirac reactor challenged Saddam Hussein to accelerate his efforts to establish a nuclear empire. This strong incentive lead to violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Other regional actors, such as Syria and Israel, are also considered to have sizable and sophisticated arsenal out of the need for deterrence based upon claims of “insecure” regional dynamics. Clearly seen in Ahmadinejad’s statement: “With reliance on Almighty God no one can prevent us from attaining such a success... Making use of nuclear technology has been turned into our national will...” Overall, Middle East has witnessed the militarization of its societies and economies, acquisition of massive conventional weapons arsenals, proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD, growth of military research and development as well as production.

B. Middle East Peace Process

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23 ibid.
24 Shyam Bhatia and Daniel McGrory, Saddam’s Race to Build the Bomb: Brighter than the Baghdad Sun, (Great Britain: Little, Brown, 1999), 11, 149-158.
25 ibid.
A conflict caused by military instability arising from arms races, changes in the balance of power or perceived vulnerabilities, can be solved by developing an arms control regime to create stability and reduce uncertainty. But, since there are direct linkages between armament conflict, high levels of military spending and economic problems in the Middle East; Spiegel and Pervin argue that there is a need for gradualism, referred as the strategy of Graduated and Reciprocated Reduction in Tensions (GRIT), to transform the psychological environment and public opinion by implementing confidence-building measures (CBMs).27 There have been a number of arms control initiatives and proposals for the Middle East; such as the Tripartite Agreement of US, France and UK in early 50s to limit arms in the region; 1974 Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) proposal put forward to United Nations General Assembly by Egypt and Iran; and US arms control initiatives of 1991.28 None of these initiatives have resulted in complete disarmament.

Within the bilateral and multilateral processes of the Middle East Peace Process, initiated at Madrid, arms control has become an integral part of the measures to resolve the conflicts. Arms control aims to reduce the likelihood of war as an instrument of policy; thus it is not only technical but also political. Arms control can be operational or structural. Structural arms control consists of the efforts to limit and reduce conventional/non-conventional military capabilities; whereas operational arms control involves implementation of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), which was the case in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It is argued that declaratory principles that address the proliferation of WMD and the need to establish a WMD free zone generate technical and military CBMs as well as structural arms measures, i.e. eventual elimination of delivery systems such as ballistic missiles. The multilateral path towards arms control and regional security is depicted by the following diagram, in relation to the bilateral economic, political and security arrangements.29

![Diagram showing interaction between bilateral and multilateral processes](image)

During the establishment of political and military CSBMs, issues to be addressed in the form of declarations and applied in measures are;

a. The dangers of an uncontrolled arms race,
b. Proliferation of WMD,
c. Regulation of arms production in the Middle East,
d. Urgency to sign NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards,

28 ibid.
29 ibid.
e. Need for a WMD Free Zone (WMDFZ) for all nuclear, biological and chemical weapons,
f. Freezing the acquisition, production and testing of ballistic missiles by Middle Eastern countries, research on enrichment of uranium and separated plutonium,
g. Creating or strengthening regional institutions and conflict prevention/ resolution centers, inter-regional verification and monitoring agencies.

Spiegel and Pervin conclude that, in the final status phase, long-term arrangements in both structural and operational arms control can pave the way to the initial implementation of a weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.

C. Middle Eastern Challenges to Nonproliferation

Referring to the global nonproliferation regimes as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); Barletta argues that these regimes face a “dizzy array of challenges” in the Middle East.30 Due to the sensitivity of the NBC weapons as well as missile technologies, the high level of commercialization and diffusion make international cooperation less likely to work efficiently; since the diffusion creates high levels of new proliferation threats, motivating more actors to violate or avoid such regimes. Focusing on the Middle East; Barletta categorizes regional dynamics as the following.31

1. Security and political factors; outweighing the influence of global regimes in the East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia,
2. Nonproliferation policies and security arrangements that are designed to address particular regional circumstances; undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the regimes in different contexts or at the global level.

Barletta claims that the political will of the leaders in the international community, as well as confronting tactics, strategies, and goals, hinder the international cooperation that is indispensable to sustain nonproliferation regimes. These confronting tactics can be exemplified with various Middle Eastern states; i.e. Egypt versus Israel.32 This argument necessitates the condition that states of the Middle East lack a comprehensive security architecture or regional nonproliferation regime. Based on the ambition to acquire WMD and non-participation in global nonproliferation regimes, the Middle East has solidly restricted the scope and effectiveness of CWC, BWC, NPT and MTCR. For instance, Israel is one of the four states of the international community that has refused to sign/ ratify the NPT; many of the Middle Eastern states have rejected to sign/ ratify the CWC, and eight states have armed with Scud-B or longer-range ballistic missiles.33 Furthermore, non-state actors such as Islamic Jihad and Al Qa’ida reportedly have threatened to employ biological and chemical weapons.

31 ibid.
32 Gerald M. Steinberg, “Middle East Peace and the NPT Extension Decision,” Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1996)
33 ibid.
Barletta formulates challenges emerging from the Middle East region that threaten international nonproliferation regimes as:  

1. Non participation: Israel is the only state in the region not to sign the NPT. Algeria, Israel, and the Sudan have not signed the BWC. Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria have failed to sign the CWC. No state in the region except Turkey is a formal member of the MTCR.

2. Subversion: Iraq has subverted the purpose of the NPT, complying with the accord and engaging in a nuclear weapons production program. Iran may be likewise subverting, although there is no unequivocal evidence.

3. Defiance: Iraq has aimed to prevent the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions mandating verification of its disarmament of WMD, not providing the necessary “change or heart”.

4. Demonstration Effects: Widespread acquisition of WMD has motivated and legitimated further acquisition of WMD capabilities, due to deterrence.

Global nonproliferation regimes reduce the uncertainty about states’ intentions and capabilities, promoting greater stability in military balances, reducing the potential lethality of military conflict, and providing political and institutional frameworks for addressing proliferation threats. But, there are also obstacles to promote nonproliferation in the Middle East. Barletta states four general problems that hinder cooperation:

1. Weak international opposition to WMD acquisition and U.S. interest in the military utility of nuclear weapons to confront biological and chemical threats,

2. Nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East, subordinated to foreign policy objectives, to gain advantages in military capability and prestige more than nonproliferation: For instance; China, North Korea, and Russia have been willing to export WMD-related technology or equipment to gain access to large sums of capital, i.e. oil markets.

3. States’ chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs, aiming to match or compensate for their rivals’ military capabilities, to enhance their security and regional prestige: WMD and missile acquisitions have become legitimate security concerns; i.e. Israeli nuclear proliferation, stimulating Egyptian and especially Syrian interest in acquiring chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.

4. Effective veto, giving the states the power over the prospects for nonproliferation regimes and other regional security arrangements; where religious, ethnic, and geopolitical rivalries have created regional security dilemmas.

However, is there any hope? Are there changing perceptions of the value of WMD in the Middle East? Cohen and Graham address this issue by questioning, whether or not WMD have become a “diminishing currency”. They propose that most of the Middle Eastern leaders, i.e. Gadafy in Libya, have realized the fact that WMD stand in the way of Western


36 Michael Barletta, “Middle East Challenges to Global Nonproliferation Regimes”

economic assistance and provoke active hostility; based on the experience of the removal of the Saddam regime. Libya has abandoned its WMD programme. As a response to American hegemonic policies on the commitment to preemption against states that pursue WMD programmes, WMD have lost the “ethos” of tools for becoming regional powers. Yet, a reaction to American economic and military power has outweighed the effectiveness of multilateral arms control. Iran, resistant to European Union multilateral sanctions, rejects compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection protocol and the demand to suspend its uranium enrichment activities.

According to the Arab states, one of the major obstacles regarding nonproliferation in the Middle East is the perceived “double standards” in NPT. This is a point of fairness. These states argue that the WMD of Israel have been tolerated, which has deteriorated the universality of NPT. Israel has not ratified the 1972 BWC or 1993 CWC either. None of the international prohibitions have prevented Israeli ambiguity and its invented, unique form of “opaque mode of going nuclear”; the “taboo” of American foreign policy. The solution can be Israel complying with NPT, CWC and BWC; which will all enhance its security as well. In a realistic fashion, nuclear programmes can be retained, prohibiting further development. Following steps towards the final phase can be: cooperation with the international nuclear export control system, prohibiting the explosive testing of nuclear devices, calling for the phased elimination of fissile material production, prohibiting the first use and the threat of first use of nuclear weapons.

D. Role of the United States

The most important external player that is operating in the Middle East is undoubtedly United States. In 2000, Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA); asked a challenging question, which would be answered through U.S military action in Iraq 2003 onwards: “What changes might the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons create in the long run for international relations?” 38 His possible outcome is NBC-backed aggression and accelerated proliferation, paving the way to the breakdown of international cooperation. Utgoff’s account can be analyzed within the upcoming “Encouraging the spread of democracy (2001)” pillar of US foreign policy. According to this approach, the United States is the world’s strongest power, which has the capability to preserve and improve the aspects of the global order that it believes are right. Does this “superpower” capability give US the right to overrule international law, by any means necessary, i.e. military force? This question has arisen in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

US manifestations, traditionally, follow the “liberty for the individual” discourse, since individual liberty has been perceived as the fundamental key to US success to create wealth, democratic institutions and values. United States present its domestic history, as a role model of pursuit of “perfect liberty”. Hence, United States preserve the right to distribute “perfect liberty”. Utgoff quotes Tony Smith, in his “America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century”, claiming that “world should be composed of democracies that cherish liberty and human rights”. 39 This argument reminds one of “White Man’s Burden”, by Rudyard Kipling, to bring civilization to “primitive”

39 ibid.
societies. In this metaphor, the uncivilized societies are the rouge states that lack democracy and preservation of human rights. Thus, US exports and defends democracy to these societies; just like President Wilson taking US into World War I to “make the world safe for democracy”.\textsuperscript{40} The problematic component of this foreign policy structure is apparent; does the US fulfill its international role as the exporter of rule of law by utilizing legitimate methods recognized/approved by international law?

Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), posits a hypothetical experiment to test what US Security Policy would call for in a nuclear-armed world.\textsuperscript{41} His argues that the US would have to act forcefully, confronting an expansionist state with modest nuclear retaliatory capability. Taking the risks of “inaction” into consideration, he proposes three possible policy solutions: an intensified “counter proliferation” policy, a military build up to allow the US confidently to defend allies against conventional aggression, and lastly a “fortress America” policy. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is abandoned, US could lead a “preventive”, conventional war against WMD proliferators. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force on March 1970.\textsuperscript{42} In terms of its nuclear safeguards, each non-nuclear weapon state party to the treaty would undertake to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to all fissionable material in all nuclear activities within its territory. Nevertheless, NPT, as a non-proliferation preventative is highly fragile due to non-participation. Many important states such as India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil have not associated themselves with NPT.\textsuperscript{43} As a second alternative; US policy could create “little NATOs”, which would be forward-deployed US capabilities to institutionalize nuclear guarantees, wherever US would be threatened by a nuclear state, i.e. “Desert Shield” as the little NATO in the Middle East. In this case, US strategy would require stronger force structures, which would mean increasing the standing forces, i.e. in Turkey, South Korea, and Persian Gulf. As soon as the “preventive war” scenarios would be revealed, additional “strategic reserve” offensive force would back up little NATOs. Last policy option; namely the “fortress America” model, would mean that US policy would divert nuclear competition, moving the risks of nuclear war away from its own territory, which would mean minimizing over-Atlantic relations. Staying out of overseas political competition by a US foreign policy towards disengagement, would indicate that US would rely more tightly on its own nuclear deterrent power –as the “superpower”-. Posen argues that the last foreign policy option would require a major challenge to the traditional US foreign policy since World War II, due to its passions and idealism that would block disengagement from world politics and political disputes.

Predicting the future, as of 2000 –prior to the Operation Iraqi Freedom-, Barry R. Posen believes that US effectiveness in dismantling Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and limiting North Korea’s nuclear materials production capability, US policy strengthens the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in line with Pentagon’s “counter proliferation initiative”. He suggests that, one day, US would face a crisis caused by aggression of a nuclear-armed regional power against US interest, when any of the scenarios of “preventive war”, “little NATOs” or isolationism through “fortress America” theory could not be implemented. The

\textsuperscript{40} ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} ibid.
possible solution could be developing new diplomatic strategies, i.e. “unusually creative diplomacy”. These predictions have partially to a great extend foreseen United States’ “preemptive action” policy that has paved the way to Iraqi “liberation” and “disarmament” through “preemptive” military intervention, which would guarantee the flow of Gulf oil, prevent the proliferation of Iraqi WMD and encourage “the spread of democracy” by overthrowing the Saddam tyranny.

CONCLUSION

Attaining global nonproliferation regimes is the only solution to prevent further acquisition of WMD; this however challenges the balance of power at the international level, including military interventions of the “superpowers”. The International community needs to create and strengthen international norms against the acquisition and use of WMD, even though these international norms will not be sufficient to meet the challenges emerging in the Middle East. Tangible security, political, and economic benefits for participation and compliance with nonproliferation regimes have to be promoted to the Middle Eastern states, through regional or sub-regional frameworks. The universality and legitimacy of international treaties, i.e. NPT, need to gain strength through Middle Eastern participation. This participation might pave the way to a progress within the Middle East Peace Process, reducing the tensions between Israel and Arab states on nuclear dilemmas. The evolving trend of devaluing WMD, as inhumane weapons that destabilize world order and promote hostility, must be supported by regional and global security arrangements to cope with proliferation and international terrorism.

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